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Introduction
A satisfactory account of how humans represent concepts has been elusive despite decades of intense research. Throughout the paper we label as 'similarity accounts' theories such as prototype (Hampton, 1995a) and exemplar theory (Kurtz, 2007; Nosofsky, 1989) . Similarity accounts share an assumption that when we categorize a novel object most of its features typically play a role: some features may be more important than others, but no feature is so important that its presence can guarantee or preclude classification into a category 1 (cf. Pothos, 2005) . Similarity accounts have led to sophisticated and compelling models. However, they do not appear adequate to cover the range of categorization results.
An excellent example of the (apparent) inadequacy of similarity accounts has been provided from the transformational paradigm, which is the focus of the present research. In Rips's (1989; Keil, 1989) classic study a bird is exposed to toxic waste which leads to changes in its appearance, leaving it looking like an insect. Despite its misfortune, the bird can still successfully mate with other birds ('successfully' in that there were normal bird offspring). The mean categorization ratings provided by Rips's participants indicated the changed bird to be more likely to be a bird, even though it looked nothing like a bird. Therefore, the transformational paradigm appears to lead to results which cannot be explained by similarity accounts of categorization (at least for some participants; cf. Hampton, Estes, & Simmons, 2007) . Researchers have explored a number of alternative theories to understand such results, for example, the classical view, individually necessary/sufficient features, or essentialism-we refer to these theories as 'beyond similarity' accounts of categorization (Rips, 2001 ).
Our purpose is to provide a contrast between similarity and beyond similarity accounts of categorization. Our particular emphasis is the transformational paradigm the transformational paradigm 4 and essentialism. The key issue is whether results with the transformational paradigm really go beyond similarity accounts.
'Beyond similarity' explanations for the transformational paradigm
Participants in Rips's (1989) study appear to consider 'mating 2 ' a sufficient feature for the category of birds: when the presence of this feature can be established, it guarantees classification into the category of birds. Conversely, necessary features are essential before an item is considered a member of a category; for example, being 'male' is a necessary feature for the category of bachelors. We refer to necessary and sufficient features as 'critical' features, in that a classification outcome can hinge on the presence or absence of such an individual feature. Critical features originate from the classical view of categorization, according to which concepts are psychologically represented as definitions, that is, a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient features (Katz, 1972) .
Definitions imply categorization processes that are discrete, unambiguous, and allow awareness of the actual definitions, but none of these predictions have been empirically supported (Barsalou, 1985; Fodor et al., 1980; Hampton, 1998) . Some researchers have examined the evidence for the existence of individual necessary or sufficient features. Rips's (1989) results have been widely cited as evidence that sufficient features do exist, but other studies have failed to provide support for the existence of critical features (Hampton, Estes, & Simmons, 2007; Larochelle, Cousineau, & Archambault, 2005; Pothos & Hahn, 2000) .
Can critical features be understood as 'very important' features? Several researchers have provided sophisticated models to predict which features are more important. For example, Sloman, Love, and Ahn (1998; see also Gelman & Wellman, the transformational paradigm 1991; Rehder, 2003 Rehder, , 2007 suggested that internal features are more important in the representation of creatures, since altering such features would result in several other features being changed (feature mutability); accordingly, internal features would have a greatly enhanced influence on category membership. Probabilistic measures provide another way to quantify a feature's importance, in terms of whether a feature is predictive of category membership and vice versa (Corter & Gluck, 1992) . However, a critical feature is qualitatively different from a very important one: the former guarantees a classification outcome, the latter simply has a lot of influence on one. At least, this is the difference between a very important feature and a critical one, in principle; some researchers have argued that this is a false distinction (Hampton, 1995b) .
Ultimately, one can argue that a critical feature for a creature to be a cat is to have the cat's DNA (for example). However, the majority of people will have a very
vague idea of what DNA is. So how can classification be guided by a feature which is not only vague but probably never directly observed as well? This leads us to the intriguing hypothesis of psychological essentialism. According to philosophical essentialism, the members of natural concepts share an essence (hidden, underlying characteristics) that makes them what they are (Putman, 1975; Kripke, 1972) .
Regarding psychology, although we are typically unaware of what such essences are, we appear to behave in a way that reflects belief in their existence (e.g., Diesendruck, & Gelman, 1999; Gelman, 2004; Gelman & Wellman, 1991; Malt, 1990; Medin & Ortony, 1989; cf. Cleeremans, 2005) . Of course, there are more specific versions of essentialist theory (e.g., Rhemtulla, & Xu, 2007; Rips et al., 2006) , however, in this work we are only interested in the general assumption of essentialist approaches, as above. Essentialism provides a compelling account of how the assumptions made about an object can affect its classification. Since Murphy and Medin (1985; cf. Heit, 1997; Pickering & Chater, 1995) , researchers have been appreciating the importance of general knowledge in categorization. We consider essentialism to be a particular way to formalize general knowledge effects in categorization (although note that there are alternative interpretations to essentialist theory, which suggest no role of general knowledge in essentialist assumptions). Note, finally, that an interesting way to understand essentialism is as a mechanism which determines whether the cognitive system should rely on perceptual information, or other information, when processing new experience. to when we are not familiar with a creature (cf. Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999; Kalish, 2002; Rips, 2001) Second, let's consider a typical earth animal and let's assume that our participants will believe that its current form has been determined through evolutionary change. Quoting from Wikipedia's entry for 'evolution', we have: (Gelman & Wellman, 1991) .
The above two points are the main theoretical assumptions in our work, and their validity is to be assessed against our empirical results. In other words, we suggest that categorization on the basis of essences would be more likely for familiar creatures than unfamiliar ones, and essences are assumed to change through the gradual processes of evolution. These two points represent our attempt to identify implications from the essentialist approach to categorization, which can be directly examined in an empirical way.
Similarity explanations for the transformational paradigm
Can we predict changes in identity in the transformational paradigm from a similarity account? There is evidence suggesting that when an object is transformed gradually it the transformational paradigm is more likely to be considered in the same category as the original one, as the gradual transformation establishes a similarity chain (Heit, 1992; cf. Stewart & Brown, 2004) .
For example, Zaki and Homa (1999) used categories defined either through systematic or random changes in a prototype. The former categories were superior to the latter, across a variety of empirical measures, such as resistance to decay, generalization, and learning rate.
Empirically, the above intuitions can be examined in the following way.
Consider a 'fast change' condition, whereby object A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 is transformed to C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4 (where the A's and C's refer to features) in one step. Also, in a 'slow change' condition, A 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 changes first to A 1 A 2 C 3 C 4 and then to C 1 C 2 C 3 C 4 . A similarity perspective suggests that object identity is more likely to be preserved in the slow condition, since in that case a similarity chain can be established between the original and the transformed object. The intermediate object provides a basis for appreciating the compatibility between the original and the (final) transformed object, thus making it more likely that the two will be perceived to be of the same kind.
Existing research with the transformational paradigm has not considered the potential role of similarity chains (e.g., Rips, 1989; Blok, Newman, & Rips, 2005; Rips, Blok, & Newman, 2006) . Thus, we cannot know whether identity changes are driven by the presence (or not) of a critical feature, or by the abruptness of the change.
The key issue is that the (general) similarity model for the transformational paradigm makes the opposite categorization prediction from the (general) essentialist model. According to the similarity model, slow changes make it more likely that a similarity chain will be formed between the initial and the final creature, so that the two will be categorized in the same way. In contrast, according to the essentialist model, slow changes are more likely to correspond to gradual, evolutionary-style development, so that the final creature will end up having a different essence from the original one.
Experiment 1a
Our objective was to provide a basic test of the relevance of similarity chains in the transformational paradigm. We sought stimuli for which there would be no general knowledge expectations and, therefore, any putative influence of essentialist assumptions should be minimal: our stimuli were (imaginary) space aliens in a distant planet. So as not to completely prejudice a putative essentialist account of our results, these space aliens were described as 'mammal-like', to provide participants some foothold on how to imagine these creatures (i.e., the creatures did not exist as electromagnetic waves or sound patterns, they were very, very broadly analogous to earth mammals). Note also that this is not to say that our participants would consider space aliens not have essences, rather that they would have very little insight about the essences of space aliens, so that when categorizing them essentialist expectations would have correspondingly little influence.
Participants
Participants were 62 undergraduate students at the University of Winchester, who volunteered to take part in the study. In all experiments the design was between participants and participants were experimentally naïve.
Materials
We created six training items, each of which was composed of the same four features another it would be a dotted line. Features were selected so that they were roughly equally salient. The pictorial format of the stimuli was necessitated by the fact that it would be hard to verbally describe transformations in unfamiliar space aliens (note that researchers in the transformational paradigm have employed descriptive and pictorial presentation of materials more or less interchangeably, without identifying any corresponding confound; this issue is further considered below).
Both conditions involved a set of six test items that had a form overall analogous to the training items, but for which all individual features were changed.
Thus, the test items were made of a large square, circles on the sides, a star on top, and an inner triangle. In the slow condition an additional set of items were created, Figure 1 . Each stimulus was printed individually on an A4 sheet.
Procedure
Participants were given a sheet with a story of an imaginary space exploration, that they were supposed to be covering as journalists, during which certain mammal-like 
Results and discussion
The results of all experiments are summarized in Table 1 . Participants were more likely to consider Oxe-Tristals the same as Tristals in the slow condition than in the fast one: chi square (1) = 4.17, p = .041. Note that, as has been the case with other related research (Hampton et al., 2007) , there was quite a lot of division in opinion regarding the categorization of the transformed creatures. A source of such division in opinion could be, for example, that some participants interpreted the space aliens in anthropomorphic terms (or in a way that corresponded to earth life forms). For such participants we would expect more 'same' responses in the fast condition and 'different' responses in the slow condition. While there were many such participants, this was not the general trend in responding: The key empirical result is that there was more of a chance of a 'same' judgment in the slow condition compared to the fast one.
These results provide support for the notion that when a similarity chain is established between an original and a transformed object, the two objects are more likely to be considered the same (Heit, 1992; Zaki & Homa, 1999) . Accordingly, a similarity account of categorization appears an adequate explanation for participants'
behavior.
-
Experiment 1b
Experiment 1a is important in that it illustrated that similarity chains can be formed, and can affect categorization, in the transformational paradigm. If similarity chains could not influence categorization even in Experiment 1a, then there would be no point in further investigating a putative contrast between similarity chains and essentialist assumptions in the transformational paradigm. Experiment 1b is as closely matched to Experiment 1a as possible, but for the following difference: in Experiment 1b, changes as a result of the toxic accident took place more slowly and were evident in subsequent generations. Moreover, the changed creatures were not assigned a unique name (which may have reinforced the perception of their being in a different category), but rather they were called the 'offspring of the afflicted Tristals'. This scenario is more consistent with putative essentialist assumptions, since changes in subsequent generations could be interpreted as resulting from changes in the creatures' DNA and, therefore, changes in the creatures' essence. Thus, Experiment 1b involved a scenario of (effectively) evolutionary change, albeit a much accelerated one (as a result of the toxic accident). Accordingly, with Experiment 1b we sought a more critical examination of the contrast between similarity chains and essentialist assumptions in the categorization of space aliens.
Participants
Participants were 84 Swansea University (mostly undergraduate) students who took part in the study for a small payment. The design was between participants.
Materials and Procedure
Materials and procedure were identical to these in Experiment 1a, but for the following change: the creatures of interest were the offspring of the affected Tristals, which could change either in one generation (fast condition) or in two generations (slow condition). In the slow condition, participants were presented with the intermediate stimuli as in Experiment 1a.
Results and Discussion
The results of Experiment 1b are nearly identical to the results of Experiment 1a (Table 1) . Participants were more likely to consider the offspring of the affected Tristals the same as Tristals in the slow condition than in the fast one: chi square (1) = 7.55, p = .006.
Experiment 1b was meant to be a more conservative test of the role of similarity chains in the transformational paradigm: we did provide a scenario of evolutionary change, but the creatures were still space aliens (general knowledge assumptions were not expected). The results were clearly in favor of the similarity account in the transformational paradigm: where it was possible to establish a similarity chain (in the slow change condition), the transformed and the original creature were categorized in the same way.
Experiment 2a
In Experiments 1a and 1b we have verified the importance of similarity chains in the transformational paradigm. The key reason why we expected the similarity explanation to be the dominant one in these experiments is that for space aliens essentialist assumptions should be less likely to be made. In other words, the average participant would not have enough familiarity with space aliens to allow assumptions about their putative essences to influence categorization decisions. We examine the validity of this conclusion in Experiment 2a (and 2b).
The aim of Experiment 2a was to create a task analogous to that of Experiment 1a, but where essentialist assumptions about category membership could more obviously bring to bear. This was achieved by eliminating the scenario involving space aliens and introducing a common earth animal, specifically crows. Crows were selected because they are a basic level category all our participants would be familiar with, and because they do not undergo any particularly drastic transformations in their lives, short of what is typically expected of birds in general (cf. Diesendruck & Gelman, 1999; Estes, 2003) .
Participants
Participants were 46 undergraduate students of Cardiff University, who took part in the study for course credit or a small payment; some of the participants were tested in other, unrelated experiments in the same session. The design was between participants.
Materials
The materials were a hypothetical scenario about how a toxic accident in South America (cf. Rips, 1989 ; Appendix 2) affected the crows in the area. Participants were told that the effects of the toxic accident resulted in changes in the offspring of the afflicted crows, either in one generation (fast condition) or over several generations (slow condition). In this case, we presented the changes of the creatures verbally and relied on our participants to imagine these; the complexity of the changes was such that a convincing pictorial presentation would have been unworkable (this was directly verified with a pilot study, outlined below).
No special name was given to the transformed crows, they were just referred to as 'the offspring of the afflicted crows' (as was the case in Experiment 2b). Once the descendants of the afflicted crows stopped changing, in both the fast and the slow condition, they could happily go on with their lives in their altered states. The changes themselves were such that the transformed creature would look nothing like the original one.
Procedure
We tried to replicate the procedure of Experiments 1a/1b. Participants were given A4
sheets with the story of the toxic waste accident and its subsequent effects on the crows in the area. The only difference between the fast and the slow conditions was that in the former case the crows changed over one generation, while in the latter case the changes were gradual and took place over several generations. Note that we did not attempt to ensure that the changes between the original and the intermediate creature were exactly equivalent to these between the intermediate and the final creature; we were only interested in whether exactly the same overall changes would lead to differences in responding between the slow and the fast condition.
Once participants had read the story, they were asked to imagine how the transformed creatures looked and to classify them as crows or not on the basis of their intuition. Participants were told that there were no correct answers and no justification had to be provided, so as to prevent them from trying to guess a 'correct' answer.
Participants indicated their response by circling a corresponding YES or NO in the sheets they received. They were tested individually and the experiment lasted for about five minutes.
Results and discussion
The results of this experiment are summarized in Table 1 . Participants were more likely to consider the transformed crows as crows in the fast condition than in the slow one: chi square (1) = 4.39, p = .036.
The result of Experiment 2a is opposite from the results of Experiments 1a/1b.
The most prominent difference between Experiment 2a and Experiments 1a/1b is that in the former case an earth creature was considered, while in the latter space aliens.
Accordingly, we suggest that an essentialist mode of categorization is more likely to be adopted with earth creatures, and one based on straightforward similarity overlap with creatures for which little is known. Of course, there are other differences between Experiments 1a/1b and 2b, for example, the fact that in one case the stimuli were presented pictorially, in the other verbally. We do not believe such a difference to be confounding. First, as noted, several researchers have used descriptive and pictorial stimuli interchangeably, without identifying any confounding influence on participants' performance (e.g., Rips et al., 2006; Blok et al., 2005) . Second, there is considerable evidence from the imagery literature that the process of imagining a stimulus (as our participants were asked to do for the changed crows) is equivalent to the process of actually perceiving the stimulus (e.g., Ishai & Sagi, 1995) . Third, arguably, it is not possible to fully counterbalance format of presentation, without destroying the manipulation. When it comes to transformations of real, earth creatures, we believed that the only effective way to communicate such information would be in a verbal way (so that participants could imagine the changes in a semiplausible way). By contrast, when it comes to space aliens, we felt that presenting information about fantastical creatures in a verbal way would have been too cumbersome and awkward.
To partly assess this issue, we ran a pilot study matched to Experiment 2a, but where the stimuli were presented in a pictorial way. Briefly, participants were given the same scenario of a toxic accident. The original creatures were crows, and participants were initially shown a picture of a crow. Using morphing software ). This finding can be interpreted in several ways. First, we would argue that when participants saw a picture of a transformed earth crow, the picture was so strange that they all decided the original and the transformed crow had nothing to do with each other. By contrast, the verbal version of the experiment allowed participants to imagine the transformation in a more plausible way and so that the ceiling effects obtained in the pilot were avoided. In other words, the most effective presentation format for Experiment 2a is the verbal format we adopted. A second interpretation is that the difference in results was due to the fact that in Experiment 2a the transformation took place in terms of discrete feature changes, but in the pilot in terms of the morphing (and distortion) of continuous dimensions. Accordingly, in the pilot study, the transformed creature effectively involved new, novel dimensions, so different to those of the original crow that participants considered the two creatures different. In conclusion, even though we think the first interpretation is more plausible, additional experimental work is needed before this issue can be more convincingly settled.
In Experiment 2b we tried harder to ensure that there would be enough scope for a similarity chain to be established between the original and the transformed creatures. This was achieved by elaborating the procedure to emphasize the intermediate creature in the slow change condition.
In this experiment we tried to encourage the formation of a similarity chain by asking participants, in the slow condition, to imagine and categorize the intermediate creatures, as well as the final ones.
Participants
Participants were 102 undergraduate students of Cardiff University, who took part in the study for course credit; some of the participants were tested in other, unrelated experiments in the same session. The design was between participants.
Materials
As before, participants received a hypothetical scenario about how a toxic waste accident in South America resulted in transformations in the local population of crows.
Procedure
We followed the procedure of Experiment 2a, but for the following difference: in the slow condition, after the first set of changes in the offspring of the afflicted crows (across two generations), participants were asked to imagine the transformed crows and to decide whether they would be called crows or not; at that point, participants did not know that they would have to provide a second classification judgment.
Subsequently, once the offspring of the afflicted crows underwent their second (and final) set of changes (across several generations), participants were asked again whether the (further) transformed crows would be called crows or not. By having participants carry out an intermediate judgment we hoped to encourage the formation of a similarity chain between the initial and final creature. As in Experiment 2a, participants were asked to indicate their responses by circling either YES or NO in the sheets they received. Participants were tested individually and the experiment lasted for about five minutes.
Results and discussion
In the slow condition participants provided two classification judgments, one for the 
General discussion
The transformational paradigm has been widely used to support 'beyond similarity' theories of categorization, such as critical features and essentialism. Can one provide a similarity account for the transformational paradigm? Our experimental design was based on the notion of similarity chains (Heit, 1992) and the intuition that creature essences are more likely to change in a slow, evolutionary-style way, rather than abruptly. In our design, generalization on the basis of similarity chains would be different from generalization on the basis of essentialism. We consider the merit of the present work exactly this, that it allows a specific contrast of similarity and essentialist approaches in categorization, in a way that is independent of the implementation details of specific essentialist or similarity theories.
With stimuli for which there would be few general knowledge expectations (space aliens), the similarity account was sufficient to explain our results. With earth creatures, results were consistent with an essentialist account of classification. We conclude that essentialism has to remain an integral part of our understanding of categorization processes, especially with real life concepts (cf. Estes, 2003; Kalish, 2002) .
Other influential 'beyond similarity' accounts are Rips et al.'s (2006) causal continuity hypothesis and sortalism (e.g., Rhemtulla & Xu, 2007) . According to causal continuity, whether the identity of a transformed object is preserved or not depends on establishing a causal connection between the original and transformed object. A sortal is a collection of objects which are created, exist, and are destroyed in similar ways. Both causal continuity and sortalism are related to essentialism, however, our results are not specific enough to tease apart such possibilities. For example, a crucial distinction in related empirical tests is between unique individuals and categories-however, we considered only the latter in our research.
How defensible is the transformational paradigm in general? Blok et al. (2005, p.20) summarize the justification in an eloquent way: "Our objective in using the transformation paradigm was to investigate what is necessarily true of object identity, not just what is customarily true; so some departure from business-as-usual is essential in order to check our hypotheses at all. Moreover, although we hope our participants have not experienced such transformations first hand, we believe that speculation about the effects of similar changes is quite natural and familiar. Closely related scenarios figure prominently in fiction and even in non-fiction." We agree entirely.
More generally, the nature of the transformational paradigm (and essentialist theory) is such that it is difficult to create studies controlled to the same degree of rigor and sophistication as studies, e.g., involving prototype and exemplar theory (e.g., cf. Nosofsky & Zaki, 2002) . The recent exchange between Malt and Sloman (2007) and Bloom (2007) amply illustrates this issue. It is indeed difficult to fully match conditions involving, on the one hand, space aliens in a distant planet and, on the other hand, earth crows. Nonetheless, certain considerations should argue in favor of the robustness of our conclusions. First, we employed specific features, avoiding possible problems with instantiations of abstract features (Markman & Maddox, 2003) . Second, we considered generalization only from positive exemplars, avoiding complications relating to generalization from negative evidence (cf. Kalish & Lawson, in press; Chin-Parker & Ross, 2004) . Third, we were careful to consistently use in all experiments classes and not a mixture of classes/individuals, since several investigators predict differences in generalization from individuals vs. classes (Gutheil & Rosengren, 1996; Rips et al., 2006) .
In sum, we hope to have provided a reasonably well-controlled examination of the scope of applicability of essentialist theory, relative to similarity-based accounts.
Footnotes
Footnote 1: What we mean here is that there is no mechanism in similarity accounts whereby a single feature logically entails the classification of an object, regardless of the information available from the other features. In other words, however important a single feature is in the classification of an object, there would typically be contributions from other features as well. Models of similarity where individual features/ dimensions are weighted typically make this assumption (Nosofsky, 1989; Tversky, 1977) . Of course, it is possible that the weight of all features would be reduced to zero apart from one, but in such cases it is debatable as to whether we still have an overall similarity process (Pothos, 2005 The materials for Experiment 2a.
Slow condition.
Welcome to this study! The study is very simple: You will shortly read a short story.
Subsequently, you will be asked a simple question relating to the story. You do not have to memorise anything, there is no correct or wrong answer, and the story sheets will be available to you while you respond. When you have read these instructions, please turn to the next sheet.
[Next sheet] United Chemicals' latest factory was built in central South America, as it was easy to find cheap land far away from cities and towns.
Unfortunately, shortly after the start of the factory's operation, there was an accident and the entire ecosystem near the factory was polluted. The company was able to rapidly neutralize the toxic substances. However, concerns that the contamination may have affected the genetic profile of some indigenous species led biologists from a local university to monitor the area for a number of subsequent years. What they found was that crows in the area did not undergo any obvious changes immediately following the accident; however, observing subsequent generations of these crows made it clear that the accident's effects were in fact quite severe. Initially, in the first generation, the offspring of the afflicted crows hardly had any feathers. The second generation crows appeared with thicker and much narrower wings. By the third generation, the crows' wings looked almost like legs. Eventually, over a few more generations, the birds were seen to move around like cats or dogs. At that point, the the transformational paradigm 36 offspring of the afflicted crows changed no further and they appeared to live happily within their new abilities and physique.
Try to imagine this process of change and how the offspring of the afflicted crows eventually turned out to be. Would your first intuition be to still call these creatures crows or not? Clearly, there is no correct or wrong answer and you do not have to justify your response. Just circle "Yes" or "No": The creatures are crows:
YES NO Fast condition. As above, but for the following difference:
…What they found was that crows in the area did not undergo any obvious changes immediately following the accident; however, observing the crows' offspring made it clear that the accident's effects were in fact quite severe. The children of the afflicted crows hardly had any feathers. Moreover, they appeared with thicker and much narrower wings, that looked like legs and which they used to move around like cats or dogs. No other changes were observed in the offspring of the afflicted crows, who appeared to live happily within their new abilities and physique. … Tables   Table 1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
